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Articles

A Primer for New Civil Law Clinic Students
Steven K. Berenson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Welcome new law clinic students. You are about to embark on an adventure
that is likely to differ significantly from most of your prior educational
experiences. Though it can be tremendously rewarding, practicing law on behalf
of actual clients can also be a jarring experience for new student-lawyers. Of
course, it is the immediacy, authenticity, and demands of actual client
representation that are the chief strength of clinical education, as well as its most
significant distinguishing feature from classroom instruction in law. The many
challenges that will arise in the course of your work on behalf of clients will
likely be fresh and new. This phenomenon represents a further advantage of the
clinical approach. In experiencing the unsettling feeling that often accompanies
such new challenges, it may be comforting to realize that the issues you are
confronting in fact arise within a long tradition and history, and that many of
your predecessors have grappled with similar, if not identical issues. Indeed, a
basic understanding of that tradition and history, along with a familiarity of some
of the common issues that have arisen from them, may prove valuable as you
struggle with your own variations on such issues. Thus, the purpose of this
primer is to provide new law clinic students with such a background understanding of the roots that underlie their current clinic experience.
The focus of this primer is on "in-house" clinics, where supervision and
review of students' case work is conducted within the law school by law school
teachers, as opposed to outside of the law school by practitioners.' This focus is
not meant in any way to demean the value of "externship" clinics, where students
work in law offices outside of the law school and are directly supervised by
practicing attorneys, working in conjunction with law school teachers:
Externship clinics are of tremendous value, have a rich tradition and history of
their own,3 and this author recommends that students experience both types of
*

The author wishes to thank Thomas Jefferson School of Law Dean Rudolph Hasl for his instrumental

role in founding the School's Veterans Legal Assistance Clinic, which was the precipitating event leading to the
writing of this primer. The author also wishes to thank Deanna Sampson for continued unwavering support.
1. See Report of the Committee on the Future of the In-House Clinic, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 508, 511
(1992). See also Philip M. Genty, Clients Don't Take Sabbaticals: The Indispensable In-House Clinic and the
Teaching of Empathy, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 273, 273 n.1 (2000); Lee Dexter Schnasi, Globalizing: Clinical
Legal Education: Successful Under-Developed Country Experiences, 6 T.M. COOLEY J. PRAC. & CLINICAL L.

129, 132 n.5 (2003).
2. Genty, supra note 1, at 273 n. 1; Schnasi, supra note 1, at 132 n.5.
3. See, e.g., J.P. Oglivy, Guidelines with Commentary for the Evaluation of Legal Externship Programs,
38 GONZ. L. REV. 155, 158 (2002-2003).
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clinics. Similarly, the focus of this primer is on civil legal aid and law school
clinics rather than on representation of indigents in criminal cases. Again, no
disrespect is intended regarding either the value of criminal clinics or the rich
tradition and history that support such clinics and the representation of indigents
in criminal cases generally.4 However, only so much of this story can be digested
in a single serving. This primer will begin with a brief history of civil legal aid
for poor people in America. It will then present an even briefer history of clinical
legal education in America.6 Before concluding, this primer will review a series
of common issues and concerns that have arisen from the often connected
histories of civil legal aid and clinical legal education.'
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CIVIL LEGAL AID FOR
POOR PEOPLE IN AMERICA

Most people identify the beginning of the delivery of free legal services to
poor people in America with the year 1876, when the German Society of New
York incorporated an entity "to render legal aid and assistance gratuitously to
those of German birth who may appear worthy thereof, but who from poverty are
unable to procure it. '' 8 In 1890, however, the organization amended its
constitution to allow the delivery of legal services to all people, regardless of
their national origin,9 and the organization became known simply as the New
York Legal Aid Society.' ° By this time, a similar organization, called the Bureau
of Justice, was formed in Chicago with a similar mandate to provide legal
assistance to needy people without regard to race, gender, or nationality." Such
organizations did not seek out particular types of cases or clients. Rather, the
legal needs of those who sought their services determined their work.'2 These
needs tended to cluster in the areas of domestic relations, wage disputes, and
4. As to the history of the provision of legal representation to indigent criminal defendants in America,
see, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Yoav Sapir, Keeping Gideon's Promise:A Comparison of the American and
Israeli Public Defender Experiences, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 203, 205 (2004). For a review of law
student representation in criminal cases, see, e.g., Steven Zeidman, SacrificialLambs or the Chosen Few?: The
Impact of Student Defenders on the Rights of the Accused, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 853 (1996).
5. See infra Part I.
6. See infra Part M.
7. See infra Part IV.
8.

EMERY A. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY OF THE AVAILABILITY OF

LAWYERS' SERVICES FOR PERSONS UNABLE TO PAY FEES 7 (1951) (quoting Deutscher Rechts-Schutz Verein,
Constitution of 1877, Article I, p. 2 ). See also MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE

1960-1973 11 (1993); Deborah J. Cantrell, A Short History of Poverty Lawyers in the
United States, 5 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L. 11, 12 (2003); William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the
Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the Legal Services Corporationfrom the 1960s to the 1990s, 17 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 241,244 n.13 (1998).
9. BROWNELL, supra note 8, at 8.
10. Cantrell, supra note 8, at 12.
11. BROWNELL, supra note 8, at 7.
12. Cantrell, supra note 8, at 12.
RIGHTS MOVEMENT,
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contract disputes. 3 For example, in New York Legal Aid's East Side branch
around the turn of the century, the majority of cases involved unpaid
wages by
4
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newly-immigrated
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Over the next three decades, organizations similar to those in New York and
Chicago began to crop up around the country. By 1919, forty-one such
organizations existed in thirty-seven cities throughout the United States.'5 Despite
this growth, much work remained to be done to remedy the lack of access to
justice by poor people in America. Indeed, in a seminal study of the delivery of
legal services to poor people in America sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation
in 1919, Boston attorney Reginald Heber Smith concluded that "the administration of American justice is not impartial, the rich and the poor do not stand on an
equality before the law, [and] the traditional method of providing justice has
operated to close the doors of the courts to the poor, and has caused a gross
denial of justice in all parts of the country to millions of persons."' 6 Among other
criticisms, Smith noted the haphazard nature of the work of legal aid
organizations." He suggested that legal aid organizations should focus more on
efforts toward the broad reform of laws in the areas of family law, wage
collection, and simplification of court procedures, rather than merely seeking
positive results for individual clients in such cases.18
Despite Smith's work, the growth in civil legal aid to poor people in America
over the next four decades was both episodic and largely localized. As to the
former, two World Wars and the Great Depression understandably and greatly
inhibited the growth of legal aid programs during those periods.' 9 Nonetheless, by
the end of 1949, there were ninety-two legal aid offices engaged in civil legal
work in the U.S., though seventeen of these were staffed solely by volunteer
lawyers. 0 As to the latter point, each of these legal aid offices operated
independently from those in other localities. While there had been, from 1911
forward, some form of national organization of legal aid providers,2 national
coordination and cooperation remained limited. Moreover, while the increase in
numbers of legal aid programs over this period may seem impressive on its own,
13.
14.
15.

Quigley, supra note 8, at 244.
DAVIS, supra note 8, at 12-13.
BROWNELL, supra note 8, at 20.

16. REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR 8 (1919). See also DAVIS, supra note 8, at 16;
Quigley, supra note 8, at 244.
17.
SMITH, supra note 16, at 197.
18. Id. at 199, 241. See also BROWNELL, supra note 8, at 6-7; DAVIS, supra note 8, at 16; Quigley, supra
note 8, at 244.
19. See BROWNELL, supra note 8, at 8; DAVIS, supra note 8, at 17.
20. BROWNELL, supra note 8, at 26.
21. Id. at 147 (describing the formation of the National Alliance of Legal Aid Societies and its
successors).

22.

Id. at 164. See also ALAN W. HOUSEMAN & LINDA E. PERLE, SECURING EQUAL JUSTICE FOR ALL: A
IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2003), http://www.clasp.org/
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ublications/LegalAidHistory.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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such growth must be considered in a context of general population growth and
rapidly expanding legal needs due to increases in the complexity of modem life.23
Thus, in his history of legal aid in the United States, Emery Brownell concluded
that, in fact, the ability of established legal aid organizations to meet the legal
needs of the populations they served increased only marginally in the period from
1916 through 1947.24
The next major expansion in the availability of legal services for poor people
in America came in the early 1960s. This should not be surprising, given the
broader social movements toward egalitarianism, civil rights, and social justice
generally during that decade. In the first years of the decade, private foundations,
such as the Ford Foundation, made resources available to support the delivery of
legal services in the context of multiservice social agencies, which were far
broader in scope than traditional legal aid programs. 25 Then in 1964, as part of
President Johnson's "war on poverty," Congress passed the Economic Opportunity Act, which created the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).2 6 Though the
original Act contained no separate provision for funding legal services, 27 by the
following year, a combination of support from the leadership of the OEO2' and
the American Bar Association (ABA), 29 along with the implicit support of the
President and Congress, resulted in the creation of the OEO Legal Services
Program (LSP). 3° That program is the direct precursor of today's federal Legal
Services Corporation (LSC), which was established by Congress in 1974. 3"
The initial budget of the OEO LSP was $25 million,32 and by the end of 1966
the program had provided 130 different grants.3 3 Yet even at this early stage,
those involved with the program debated how best to use the entity's limited

23. BROWNELL, supra note 8, at 31.
24. Brownell's conclusion was that "the ability of the established organizations to meet the full need in
their communities had risen from fifty-one percent in 1916 to fifty-five percent in 1947." Id. at 33.
25. See Alan W. Houseman, Political Lessons: Legal Services for the Poor A Commentary, 83 GEO.
L.J. 1669, 1672 (1995) [hereinafter Houseman, Political Lessons]. Among the now well-known organizations
that received funding were New York's Mobilization for Youth (MFY), Action for Boston Community
Development (ABCD), New Haven's Legal Assistance Association, and Washington D.C.'s United Planning
Organization. Id.
26. Id. at 1673. See also Cantrell, supra note 8, at 17.
27. See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 7.
28. The late President Kennedy's brother-in-law Sargent Shriver was the first director of the OEO. Id.;
Cantrell, supra note 8, at 17.
29. Alan Houseman, a legal aid lawyer in the 1960s and current Director of the Center for Law and
Social Policy (CLASP) praises then ABA President and future Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell and others
for "progressive leadership" in garnering the support of the organized bar for federally funded legal services for
the poor. Houseman, PoliticalLessons, supra note 25, at 1764.
30. Id. at 1673. See also HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 7.
31. See Quigley, supra note 8, at 254.
32. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 11.
33. National Legal Aid and Defender Association, History of Civil Legal Aid, http://www.nlada.
org/About/AboutHistoryCivil (last visited Oct. 11, 2006) [hereinafter NLADA History] (on file with the
McGeorge law Review).

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38
resources. Some advocated for the individual, client-by-client approach that had
dominated earlier legal aid practice.34 However, others argued that in order to
maximize the impact of the program's effectiveness for its poor clients, broader
efforts needed to be undertaken to reform the laws, programs, and procedures
that contributed to the stubborn presence of poverty in America. Among the
techniques advocated by the latter group was "test case," or "impact" litigation,35
modeled on the National Association for the Advancement of Colored Persons
(NAACP) Legal Defense Fund's campaign against segregated schools,36 and the
American Civil Liberties Union's (ACLU) law reform suits.37 The latter group
also advocated engaging in lobby activities to influence the content of
legislation.3 8 Some of the OEO LSP grants during this period went to fund "back
up centers," which were exclusively focused on either conducting or supporting
large-scale law reform suits, while local legal aid and "storefront" offices
continued to handle the bulk of the individual cases funded by the program.3 9 A
third approach also emerged, which focused on organizing, educating, and
empowering the client community served by the program. 40 Indeed, this debate
regarding "individual service," "impact" representation, and "community
lawyering" persists to this day, 4' and will be discussed further in Part IV.A.
Not surprisingly, the more aggressive law reform efforts of the program
resulted in a political backlash.42 Details of the various skirmishes are provided

34. See supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text. See also Marc Feldman, Political Lessons: Legal
Servicesfor the Poor,83 GEO. L.J. 1529, 1562 (1995).
35. See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 33 (discussing the views of Ed Sparer, the original director of MFY's
Legal Unit and an important figure in the development of legal services during this period); HOUSEMAN &
PERLE, supra note 22, at 11 (discussing Earl Johnson, the second director of the OEO LSP).
36. See, e.g., JACK GREENBERG, CRUSDERS IN THE COURTS (1994); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
(1975); MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION 1925-1950
(1987).
37. See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, IN DEFENSE OF AMERICAN LIBERTIES: A HISTORY OF THE ACLU
(1990); Ruth B. Cowan, Women's Rights Through Litigation: An Examination of the American Civil Liberties
Union Women's Rights Project, 1971-1976, 8 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 373 (1976); Robert L. Rabin,
Lawyers for Social Change:Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207 (1976) (discussing both
the ACLU and the NAACP).
38. See Quigley, supra note 8, at 246 n.27 (quoting the original OEO Guidelines for Legal Services
Programs).
39. Cantrell, supra note 8, at 18; Houseman, PoliticalLessons, supra note 25, at 1683; HOUSEMAN &
PERLE, supra note 22, at 11.
40. This approach was most closely identified with Jean and Edgar Cahn, two politically connected
lawyers who were instrumental in the creation of the OEO LSP. See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 32. The Calms
articulated their approach in a seminal article entitled The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J.
1317 (1964). See also Cantrell, supranote 8, at 16-17.
41. See Feldman, supra note 34, at 1576-77. See also Gary Bellow & Jean Chain, Paths Not Yet Taken:
Some Comments on Feldman's Critique of Legal Services Practice, 83 GEO. L.J. 1633, 1645-46 (1995);
Houseman, Political Lessons, supra note 25, at 1677-78.
42. Cantrell, supra note 8, at 27; HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 14; NLADA History, supra
note 33; Quigley, supra note 8, at 248.
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elsewhere43 and go beyond the scope of this primer. The 1974 legislation that
created the current federal LSC was the result of a compromise between
supporters of legal services, who thought a more independent and centralized
structure would insulate the existing OEO LSP from the types of local and
political skirmishes that had hampered it in recent years," and critics of the
program, including President Nixon,45 who wanted to place limits on the types of
law reform activities recipients of funds under the program could engage in.46
Despite this potentially troubling mix, the mid-to-late 1970s represented
something of a high water mark for the federal legal services program, with its
scope and funding achieving historic highs.4
But the election of Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 ended the relatively
good times for the legal services program. 48 Reagan himself had clashed with
LSP recipient California Rural Legal Assistance while he was Governor of
California, 9 and he carried a lasting bitterness toward the legal services program
into his Presidency. 0 Though Reagan was unable to terminate the program
entirely, his administration was able to hamper its effectiveness by significantly
reducing its budget,5' imposing substantive restrictions on the work of the
program,52 and appointing members to the LSC Board who were overtly hostile
to the program.53 These actions began an era of budget reductions and program
restrictions that have plagued the LSC on and off to the present day. 4

43. Cantrell, supra note 8, at 27-29; HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 14-16; Quigley, supra note
8, at 248-51.
44. Both as originally proposed, and as ultimately created, the LSC was to be an entity independent
from, though funded by, the federal government, with its own governing board of directors. See HOUSEMAN &
PERLE, supra note 22, at 17-20; NLADA History, supra note 33; Quigley, supra note 8, at 252-53.
45. Nixon had tried to eliminate the OEO LSP in 1973. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 16;
NLADA History, supra note 33; Quigley, supra note 8, at 253.
46. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 17; Quigley, supranote 8, at 251-53.
47. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 22; Quigley, supranote 8, at 254-55.
48. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 27; NLADA History, supra note 33; Quigley, supra note 8,
at 255.
49. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 15; NLADA History, supra note 33; Quigley, supra note 8,
at 249-50.
50. Cantrell, supra note 8, at 29.
51. For example, the LSC budget appropriation was cut twenty-five percent, from $321 million in fiscal
year 1981 to $241 million in fiscal year 1982. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 28. See also NLADA
History, supra note 33; Quigley, supra note 8, at 257.
52. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 28; Quigley, supranote 8, at 258.
53. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 28-29; NLADA History, supra note 33.
54. For example, the fiscal year 2005 federal budget appropriation for LSC was approximately $330
million dollars. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007 10, http://www.lsc.gov/
about/budget/FY07BReq.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). However, in inflation adjusted dollars,
that amount would have had to have been more than doubled (approximately $687 million) to equal the
purchasing power of the fiscal year 1981 appropriation. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUST.
GAP IN AM. 2 (2005), http://www.lsc.gov/JusticeGap.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). See also
HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 29-31 (discussing attacks on the program throughout the 1980s);
Quigley, supra note 8, at 258-59.
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Counterintuitively, the greatest blows to the program may have been struck
during the Clinton administration rather than during the Republican administrations of the 1980s. ' 5 Though the LSC budget appropriation reached an all time
high of $415 million in fiscal year 1995, the budget appropriation was reduced to
$278 million for fiscal year 1996.56 Moreover, the most extensive set of
restrictions on the activities of the program in its history was enacted at this time
as well. Some of these restrictions narrowed the range of cases that could be
handled by programs receiving LSC funds. For example, such programs were
precluded from participating in redistricting and abortion cases or advancing
attorneys' fees claims. 7 Additionally, the restrictions narrowed the range of
clients who could be represented by LSC funded programs. Lawyers in such
programs were precluded from representing prisoners, many immigrants, and
public housing residents facing eviction based on drug-related charges 8
Moreover, LSC recipient lawyers were precluded from engaging in certain types
of activities, including class action representation; training for political activities
such as boycotts, picketing, or strikes; lobbying; and challenging the validity
federal or state welfare laws in the course of representing individual clients in
welfare cases. 9 Though program recipients launched legal challenges against
many of the restrictions, 6° the U.S. Supreme Court struck down only the
prohibition on challenging the validity of welfare laws (on First Amendment
grounds) in Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez.6'

Many legal services

providers subdivided their programs into separate entities, made up of one that
received LSC funds and therefore could only engage in individual case
representation within the parameters set forth by the restrictions, and one that
utilized no LSC money and could therefore engage in the kinds of work or serve
the categories of clients prohibited by the restrictions.62
One positive development to result from the restrictions that affected the
federal legal services program during the 1980s and 1990s was the rise of
additional or alternative sources of funding and programs to support the delivery
of legal services to poor people. One such common source came from Interest on
Lawyer Trust Account (IOLTA) programs. Pursuant to such programs, lawyers
are required by applicable state bar authorities to keep client funds in interest
bearing accounts, with the interest to be used to fund legal services programs for
poor people.63 Initially, such programs were challenged by conservative public
55.
Gingrich's
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Though in fairness, many of these efforts originated in the House of Representatives following Newt
ascension to the Speaker position in 1994. HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 34.
Quigley, supra note 8, at 259-261.
Id.at 261.
HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 34-35; Quigley, supra note 8, at 261.
HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 35; Quigley, supra note 8, at 261.
See HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 37.
531 U.S. 533 (2001). See also HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 38.
See Cantrell, supra note 8, at 30-31; HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 37-39.
HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 32.
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interest groups on grounds of the Fifth Amendment's takings clause. After
protracted court battles, the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the takings
clause does not require individual lawyers to return IOLTA funds to their clients
and permits state bar entities to use such funds for the provision of legal
services.' Despite this victory, IOLTA programs have been hampered in recent
years by low interest rates and higher administrative fees charged by banks.65
In addition to IOLTA programs, a wide range of programs supported by bar
associations, state "access to justice" commissions, law schools, and private
foundations, have stepped into the breach created by retrenchments in funding to
and restrictions on the practice of federally funded legal services programs. 66 As a
result, the present federal LSC budget only represents an approximate one-third
of the total sum of money from all sources spent on the delivery of legal services
to poor people in America each year.67 Since 1995, the LSC has required
statewide coordination programs in an effort to harmonize the work of this wide
range of legal services providers at the individual state level.68
Despite this vast array of legal services providers for the poor, the overall
amount of legal services available still falls far short of meeting the needs of the
poor for legal services. The most recent national assessment of the legal needs of
the poor was the ABA's 1994 Comprehensive Legal Needs Study. 69 This study
determined that approximately eighty percent of poor Americans do not have the
assistance of an attorney when they are faced with a serious situation where the
aid of an attorney might make a difference. Subsequent surveys at the state level
have reached similar results, 7' and experts in the field attest to the continuing
validity of the results of the ABA Study.72
Along with other reasons, this gap between the legal needs of the poor and
available legal resources has led to a great expansion in the number of selfrepresented litigants in our nation's various court systems.73 In an effort to
address the burdens created by this increase in self-representation, and in their

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See Brown v. Wash. Legal Found., 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 41.
Id. at 39.
See id. at 41.
Id. at 39.

69. See AM. BAR ASS'N, LEGAL NEEDS AND CIVIL JUST.: A SURVEY OF AMS. (1994). http://www.
abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/legalneedstudy.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). See
also Steven K. Berenson, A Cloak for the Bare: In Support of Allowing Prospective Malpractice Liability
Waivers in Certain Pro Bono Cases, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 1, 15 (2005); Linda F. Smith, The Potential of Pro
Bono, 72 UMKC L. REV. 447,450 (2004).
70.

See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., SERVING THE CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF Low INCOME AMERICANS: A

13 (2000).
71. See Smith, supra note 69, at 450 n.23.
72. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1785 n.1 (2001). See also
LSC, Documenting the Justice Gap, supra note 54, at 2-3.
73. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, A Family Law Residency Program?:A Modest Proposal in Response
to the Burdens Created by Self-Represented Litigants in Family Court, 33 RUTGERS L.J. 105, 107 (2001).
SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

610

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 38

typical manner of trying to squeeze maximum benefit out of limited resources,
legal services providers have begun offering a variety of forms of limited legal
assistance to poor people. These limited legal assistance programs are designed
to provide help and support to such people who, nonetheless, will continue to
represent themselves with regard to their particular legal needs. Such assistance
can take a wide variety of forms including self-help classes, telephone hotlines,
and assistance in preparing standard court forms and other legal documents.74 In
fact, it seems that the fastest area of growth in legal services programs in the new
75
century has been the proliferation of limited legal assistance programs.
III.

AN EVEN BRIEFER HISTORY OF CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION IN AMERICA

Perhaps not surprisingly, there is a rough correlation between important dates
in the development of civil legal aid in America and important dates in the
development of clinical legal education. For example, just as the origins of the
modem legal aid office can be traced to the founding of the New York Legal Aid
Society in the late Nineteenth Century, most historians locate the first law school
clinical program in a "legal dispensary" operated by students at the University of
Pennsylvania School of Law in 1893.76 Over the next couple of decades, similar
programs were initiated at a variety of law schools." The programs shared the

characteristics of being voluntary, student-run, non-credit offerings, 78 and are
often described as providing outlets for students who were tired of the confines
of the classroom and the case method associated with Harvard Law School Dean
Christopher Columbus Langdell.79
74. Id. at 131.
75. See Robert Bickel, Limited Legal Services: Is it Worth It?, 39 COLUM. I.L. & SOC. PROBS. 331, 339
(2006).
76. See Robert MacCrate, Educating a Changing Profession: From Clinic to Continuum, 64 TENN. L.
REV. 1099, 1103 (1997); William P. Quigley, Introduction to Clinical Teaching for the New Clinical Law
Professor:A View from the FirstFloor, 28 AKRON L. REV. 463, 467 (1995) [hereinafter Quigley, Introduction].
77. Law schools with similar projects included those at Cincinnati, Denver, George Washington,
Harvard, Minnesota, Northwestern, Tennessee, and Yale Universities. See MacCrate, supra note 76, at 1103;
Quigley, Introduction, supra note 76, at 467. See also Peter A. Joy, The Ethics of Law School Clinic Students
as Student-Lawyers, 45 S. TEXAS L. REV. 815, 815 n.1 (2004).
78. See Margaret Martin Barry, Jon C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy, Clinical Education for this Millennium:
The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 6 (2000); Douglas A. Blaze, Ddjt vu All Over Again: Reflections on
Fifty Years of Clinical Education, 64 TENN. L. REV. 939, 940 (1997); Quigley, Introduction, supra note 76, at
467.
79. Of course, prior to development of the case method by Langdell and others, see Barry, Dubin & Joy,
supra note 78, at 5 n.7, all legal education was clinical - in the form of apprenticeships in which aspiring
lawyers learned the law in the offices of practicing lawyers. See Suzanne Valdez Carey, An Essay on the
Evolution of Clinical Legal Education and It's Impact on Student Trial Practice, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 509, 510
(2003); Quigley, Introduction, supra note 76, at 465. The case method was viewed by proponents as a more
rigorous alternative to the sometimes uneven results of training by apprenticeship. Carey, supra, at 511. Though
the case method achieved dominance by the beginning of the Twentieth Century, the conflict between the
proponents of the case method and those of more practice-oriented training never died out entirely. See Joy,
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The first for-credit, law school clinical programs that approximated the model
used presently by in-house clinical programs appeared in the late 1920s and early
1930s. ° John Bradway initiated these programs, the first being a six-week
experimental program at the University of Southern California law school,8' and
the second being a similar but larger scale program that Bradway was invited to set
up at Duke University following the success of his first such program.82 Bradway
had earlier been a legal aid lawyer in Philadelphia.83 He had also collaborated with
Reginald Heber Smith in writing an early history of legal aid representation in the
United States on behalf of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.M Bradway's past
further cemented the link between legal aid and clinical legal education.
In addition to his groundbreaking work in setting up law school clinical
programs, Bradway was a prolific writer, and his articles from this era laid an early
foundation for the intellectual development of the clinical legal education
movement.83 This foundation also received a boost from within the legal realist
86
movement. In particular, Yale Law School Professor Jerome Frank, who served

supra note 77, at 818-19; Quigley, Introduction, supra note 76, at 466 n.14.
80. Two important interim developments were the publication of William Rowe's article, Legal Clinics
and Better Trained Lawyers -A Necessity, I1 ILL. L. REV. 591 (1917), and the publication of a study by Alfred
Z. Reed, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW (1921), that was funded by the Carnegie
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. See Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 78, at 6-8. The "Reed
Report," among other conclusions, called for increased practice skills training in law school. Id. at 7-8.
81. See MacCrate, supra note 76, at 1104.
82. Id.
83. See John M. Lindsey, John Saeger Bradway-The Tireless Pioneerof Clinical Education, 4 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 1, 4 (1979); MacCrate, supra note 76, at 1102.
84. See MacCrate, supra note 76, at 1102 n.18 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF
LABOR, BULL. No. 398 (1926)).
85. See, e.g., John S. Bradway, The Beginning of the Legal Clinic of the University of Southern
California,2 S.CAL. L. REV. 252 (1929); John S. Bradway, The Nature of a Legal Aid Clinic, 3 S.CAL. L. REV.
173 (1930); John S. Bradway, LegalAid Clinic as a Law School Course, 3 S.CAL. L. REV. 320 (1930); John S.
Bradway, Legal Aid Clinics in Less Thickly PopulatedCommunities, 30 MICH. L. REV. 905 (1932); John S.
Bradway, Legal Aid Clinic: Training for the Art of Law Practice, 7 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 236 (1932); John S.
Bradway, Some Distinctive Features of a Legal Aid Clinic Course, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (1933); John S.
Bradway, ClinicalPreparationfor Admission to the Bar, 8 TEMP. L.Q. 185 (1933); John S. Bradway, The Legal
Aid Clinic as an Educational Device, 7 AM. L. SCH. REV. 1153 (1934); John S. Bradway, The Classroom
Aspects of the Legal Aid Clinic, 8 BROOK. L. REV. 373 (1939); John S. Bradway, The Objectives of Legal Clinic
Work, 24 Wash. U. L.Q. 173 (1939); John S. Bradway, Education for Law Practice: Students Can Be Given
Clinical Experience, 34 A.B.A. J. 103 (1948); John S. Bradway, "Case Presentation"and the Legal Aid Clinic,
1 J. LEGAL EDUC. 280 (1948).
86. A thorough discussion of legal realism lies beyond the scope of this primer. Moreover, the term
belies easy definition. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169 (1992). At a minimum though, Legal Realism challenged the prevailing
view propounded by Langdell and others that law was a science, and that legal rules could be deduced from
appellate cases through the use of logic and reason. See Robert J. Cottrol, Justice Advanced: Comments on
William Nelson's Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal Realism, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
839, 842-43 (2004). Rather, Legal Realists focused more on the influence of things such as social science,
public policy, and judicial personalities on the development of the law. Id. For much more detailed and
searching analyses of Legal Realism, see Horwitz, supra, at 169; LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE
1927-1960 (1986).
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as General Counsel to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and Chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission under President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt and as a Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,87
was a noted advocate on behalf of clinical legal education. Indeed, Frank's article
Why Not a ClinicalLaw School?8 9 is frequently-cited to this day in discussions of
clinical legal education. 90
Despite this strong intellectual foundation, the growth of law school clinics
was slow until the 1960s. Isolated clinical programs took root at various schools,
such as the full service, in-house clinic started at the University of Tennessee in
1947 by Charles Miller, a former student in Bradway's clinic at Duke. 9' Still, by the
late 1950s, only a handful of in-house programs existed throughout the country. 92
As had been the case with the growth in the 1960s of legal aid programs, a
combination of the "zeitgeist" of the 1960s, 93 along with the financial support of
entities such as the Ford Foundation,94 led to an exponential growth in law school
clinical programs during that decade. In 1958, the Ford Foundation provided a
grant of $800,000 to the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA)
to establish a National Council on Legal Clinics (NCLC) to provide grants to law
schools to establish clinical legal education programs.9 This manner of providing
resources to law schools through NLADA provided additional enhancement to the
already existing connections between legal aid programs and clinical legal
education.
The Ford Foundation was pleased enough with its initial foray into clinical
legal education that it provided an additional $950,000 in funds in 1965. 96 This
time, the money went to a successor entity of NCLC called the Council on
Education in Professional Responsibility, which was later renamed the Council on
Legal Education for Professional Responsibility (CLEPR).97 The acronym CLEPR
became well known in clinical legal education circles and, indeed, an important
part of the movement's lore. 98 By the time it concluded its existence in 1978,
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25-35 (1985).
88. Id. at 62.
89. 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933).
90. See, e.g., Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 78, at 8 n.22; Blaze, supra note 78, at 944; Carey, supra
note 79, at 513; MacCrate, supra note 76, at 1105; Quigley, Introduction, supra note 76, at 468-69.
91. See Blaze, supra note 78, at 940-41; MacCrate, supra note 76, at 1106.
92. Blaze, supranote 78, at 941 & n.14. See also Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 78, at 10.
93. Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 78, at 12. See also PHILIP G. SCHRAG & MICHAEL MELTSNER,
REFLECTIONS ON CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 3 (1998) ("Clinical legal education was born in the social
ferment of the 1960s.").
94. See Joy, supra note 77, at 821.
95. Blaze, supra note 78, at 941-42; MacCrate, supra note 76, at 1108.
96. Blaze, supranote 78, at 942; MacCrate, supra note 76, at 1109.
97. Blaze, supranote 78, at 942; Carey, supra note 79, at 515; MacCrate, supra note 76, at 1109.
98. See, e.g., Michael Meltsner & Philip G. Schrag, Reportfrom a CLEPR Colony, 76 COLUM. L. REV.
581 (1976).
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CLEPR had provided more than $6,500,000 in grants to more than 100 law
schools. 99 At this juncture, clinical legal education was firmly rooted throughout the
legal academy. '°°
The fast pace in the growth of clinical legal education in the two decades
following the Ford Foundation's initial grants has continued since that time.
Indeed, the breadth and range of clinical legal education programs offered at
American law schools is astounding. Consistent with clinical legal education's
connections to legal aid in the early 1960s, the focus of most of the clinical
education programs developed at that time was in the same areas where most legal
aid offices focused their attention then: landlord-tenant issues, domestic relations
matters, and public assistance cases. This continued to be the case into the 1970s.
Some clinics also mirrored the focus on "impact litigation" at this time, in areas
such as civil rights, consumer rights, environmental rights, and poverty rights.' °
However, at present, the subject matter of clinical course offerings has expanded to
encompass nearly the entire range of legal practice areas. Law schools presently
offer clinics in fields including alternative dispute resolution, criminal prosecution
and defense, securities arbitration, community economic development, health law
and policy, and U.S. Supreme Court litigation.0 2 A small number of schools have
even experimented with commercial, fee-for-service clinics.' 3 The range of
externship programs offered by law schools has grown exponentially alongside the
expansion of in-house clinical course offerings. Moreover, externship pedagogy
has matured into a deep and sophisticated discipline, as has been the case with the
pedagogy of in-house clinical teaching.' °4
Beyond the above-described growth, clinical legal education has, over time,
assumed a much more central role within the overall course of study in U.S. law
schools. Many schools have incorporated training in a variety of legal practice
skills into the first year curriculum, if not live-client work itself.'0 5 Other schools
offer progressions or continua of clinical and skills courses over the final two years
of law school'06 or teach clinical skills and values "pervasively" throughout the
curriculum.' 7 What seems clear is that few students today will graduate law school
without any exposure at all to the skills, values, and contexts that shape the actual
practice of law, as was too often the case in the past.' 8

99. Blaze, supra note 78, at 942.
100. Id.
101. See Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 78, at 13.
102. See Carey, supra note 79, at 528.
103. See Gary Laser, Significant CurricularDevelopments: The MacCrate Report and Beyond, I
CLINICAL L. REV. 425, 437-38 (1994). See also Martin Guggenheim, Fee Generating Clinics: Can We Bear the
Costs?, 1 CLINICAL L. REV. 677 (1994).
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See, e.g., Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 78, at 16-18.
See id. at 41-44.
See id. at 44-46; Laser, supra note 103, at 425; MacCrate, supra note 76, at 1114.
See Barry, Dubin & Joy, supra note 78, at 46-49.
See id. at 32.
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IV. CORRESPONDING AND DIVERGING "BIG PICTURE" ISSUES THAT
EMERGE FROM LEGAL AID AND CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION'S COMMON ANCESTRY

As a result of their intertwined and overlapping histories, many of the
primary issues that arose and continue to present themselves in the legal aid
context have analogues in the clinical legal education context. Though sometimes
the issues appear somewhat differently in each context, and sometimes they
diverge altogether, the connections are sufficient to warrant common discussion.
Therefore, the following section discusses five such major issues in each context.
The issues discussed are: a) individual versus impact representation; b) quality
versus quantity of services; c) political interference; d) resource limitations; and
e) professional status.
A. Individual Versus Impact Representation
The origins of the "individual v. impact" debate in the legal aid context were
discussed in Part II of this primer. '9 By the late 1960s, at least among the leading
figures in the legal aid movement, it appears that sentiment was running in favor
of the impact litigation approach."0 This focus on "test case" litigation yielded
many encouraging results. For example, though no legal aid staff attorney had
taken a case to the U.S. Supreme Court prior to 1967, between 1967 and 1972,
legal services program staff lawyers presented 219 cases to the high Court, 136
of which were decided on the merits, resulting in seventy-three victories for the
legal services lawyers and their clients."' Among the most noteworthy of these
victories were King v. Smith," 2 which recognized federal court jurisdiction over
cases involving state welfare benefits; Shapiro v. Thompson,"3 which struck

down state welfare residency requirements as violating the federal constitutional
right to travel; and Goldberg v. Kelly, ' 4 which found that the due process clause
requires a pre-termination hearing prior to discontinuation of welfare benefits." 5
However, the legal services program's impact litigation strategy led to
defeats as well as victories. For example, just a month after deciding Goldberg v.

109. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
110. See Cantrell, supra note 8, at 17-18; HOUSEMAN & PERLE, supra note 22, at 11-12; Quigley, supra
note 8, at 245-48.
111. Quigley, supra note 8, at 250 & n.57 (citing EARL JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE
FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 189 (1978)).
112. 392 U.S. 309,311-13 (1968).
113. 394 U.S. 618, 629-30, 641-42 (1969).
114. 397 U.S. 254, 263-64 (1970).
115. See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 60-68 (discussing King v. Smith); 77-80 (discussing Shapiro v.
Thompson); 99-118 (discussing Goldberg v. Kelly). See also Cantrell, supra note 8, at 19-23; HOUSEMAN &
PERLE, supra note 22, at 13; Quigley, supra note 8, at 250-5 1.
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Kelly, the Court handed down its decision in Dandridge v. Williams," 6 finding it
permissible for a state to set its maximum welfare grant at a level below the
federally-determined "standard of need" for a family of a given size." 7 In the end,
the Court never went nearly so far as to recognize a Constitutional "right to live,"
or a guaranteed minimum income for all persons, as had been the goal of Ed
Sparer and many of the other architects of the legal services program's impact
litigation strategy.118
As discussed previously, the legal services program's successes in impact
cases led to a political backlash that resulted in both funding cuts and substantive
restrictions that have made it much more difficult for legal services lawyers to
pursue impact litigation in recent decades. "' Additionally, questions have been
raised about the efficacy of impact litigation generally. For example, despite the
fact that the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's campaign against segregated schools
is often held out as the paradigmatic impact litigation campaign,'20 more than two
2
decades after the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,'
legal scholar and former NAACP lawyer Derrick Bell questioned whether the
NAACP lawyers' absolute commitment to desegregation compromised their
clients' legitimate interests in improved school quality for African-American
children.122 Moreover, even as legal commentators recently celebrated Brown's
fiftieth anniversary, most had to acknowledge the stubborn persistence of
segregated schools throughout that period.' 23 In addition to the mixed records of
desegregation and welfare reform litigation,124 impact litigation campaigns in a
variety of areas, including prison and mental health institutional reform, housing,
health care, and child welfare, have yielded a similar mix of
apparent legal
25
ground.'
the
on
conditions
in
improvement
limited
with
victories
The above-described limitations regarding impact litigation have led to at
least some movement in the legal services community toward the kind of
focused-individual case or community-oriented lawyering perspective that was

116. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
117. See DAVIS, supranote 8, at 129-32; Cantrell, supra note 8, at 23-24.
118. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 37-38, 142-45; Cantrell, supra note 8, at 24.
119. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
120. See supranote 36 and accompanying text.
121. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
122. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
123. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, American Public Schools Fifty Years After Brown: A Separate and
Unequal Reality, 47 HOW. L.J. 341, 352 (2004); Joe R. Feagin & Bernice McNair Barnett, Success and Failure:
How Systemic Racism Trumped the Brown v. Board of Education Decision, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1099; Jack B.
Weinstein, Brown v. Board of Education After 50 Years, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 289, 292-94 (2004).
124. See supra notes 111-118 and accompanying text.
125. See generally GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (1993). Cf Peter Margulies, The New Class Action Jurisprudenceand Public Interest Law, 25 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 487 (1999) [hereinafter Margulies, Public Interest Law].
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discussed above. 2 6 However, lawyers' efforts in this regard have also been
subject to a withering critique, this time from academics within clinical legal
education. Such academics have accused anti-poverty lawyers of dominating
their clients and privileging the lawyers' own goals and perspectives at the
expense of the subordinated communities they purport to serve.12 Though these
critics do not despair of the possibility of a genuine community-oriented law
practice, they note the substantial challenges presented to achieving that goal,
and the substantial changes that must be made in the prevailing practices of antipoverty lawyers to do So.28 Perhaps the combined critiques of and challenges
presented by impact and community-oriented litigation should lead legal services
lawyers back in the direction of individual case representation. 29 However,
challenges in that regard will be discussed in the next section.
Though the so-called individual versus impact debate has not played as
dominant a role in the law school clinic context as it has in the legal services
context, law school clinics and their advocates have, nonetheless, paid significant
attention to the question of the appropriate form of representation to pursue in
such clinics. Given most modem clinics' origin in the legal aid offices of the late
1950s and early 1960s,"3 ° it is not surprising that the initial focus and ultimately
the "default" approach of such clinics has been individual representation.
Moreover, individual representation cases present pedagogical advantages as
well. The advantages of an individual representation case are that it offers a
student the greatest possibility of seeing a case from start to finish over the
course of the student's time in the clinic, and it gives the student a sense of
"ownership" over cases that results from the student being competent to handle
most, if not all, of the lawyering tasks required by the case.'3'
However, law school clinics undeniably have a social justice mission, as well
as a mission to educate students.' 32 To the extent that one views impact litigation
as better suited to improving the conditions of larger numbers of poor clients,"'
126. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., GERALD P. LoPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING (1992); Anthony V. Alfieri, Impoverished
Practices, 81 GEO. L.J. 2567 (1993); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday
Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990). See also Cantrell, supra note 8, at 31; Paul
R. Tremblay, Rebellious Lawyering, Regnant Lawyering, and Street-Level Bureaucracy, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 947,
951-54 (1992).
128. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Lessons of Client
Narrative, 100 YALE L.J. 2107, 2131-34 (1991); Lopez, supranote 127, at 28; White, supra note 127, at 52.
129. For a thoughtful analysis that rejects the classic individual versus impact dichotomy, see Peter
Margulies, Political Lawyering, One Person at a Time: The Challenge of Legal Work Against Domestic
Violence for the Impact Litigation/Client Service Debate, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 493 (1996) [hereinafter,
Margulies, Political Lawyering]. See also Feldman, supra note 34, at 1537-39 (questioning the individual
versus impact distinction).
130. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
131. See, e.g., Paul D. Reingold, Why Hard Cases Make Good (Clinical)Law, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 545,
549 (1996).
132. See, e.g., Jon C. Dubin, Clinic Designfor Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461 (1998).
133. See supranote 35 and accompanying text.
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one is also likely to view such cases as better serving law school clinics' social
justice mission than individual case representation. Moreover, larger scale cases
may better engage both clinic students and faculty than smaller scale ones, due to
the relative complexity of the issues involved and the quality of opposing
counsel.'34 On the other hand, larger scale cases may strain clinic resources in a
variety of ways,'35 may result in a shift in case work and responsibility
from
37
students to faculty, 3 6 and may involve the clinic in political controversy.
Given the growth in clinical legal education,'38 it is increasingly possible for
both clinic students and faculty to avoid having to resolve the individual versus
impact question.' Many law schools offer a wide range of clinics, giving
students the ability to choose among clinics focusing on individual or impact
cases as they see fit. Moreover, the individual versus impact question is beside
the point in the fast growing range of transactional clinics available at law
schools. However, at least some clinic students and faculty must still face the
question in the context in which they work. Therefore, clinic student familiarity
with the questions and trade-offs involved remains valuable.
B. Quality Versus Quantity
As the above-described history makes clear,' 40 and as will be discussed
further below, 4' resource limitations have always been an issue for legal aid
practitioners, and have generated much discussion of the best approach to take to
deal with such limitations. Indeed, the just-discussed individual versus impact
debate represents one form that the discussion of how to stretch limited resources
has taken. However, even within the individual representation context, given that
poor people's needs for legal representation has always greatly outstripped the
available supply, 42 there has always been pressure on legal aid providers to try to
stretch their limited resources to serve a greater number of eligible clients. The

134. See Reingold, supra note 131, at 568. Note that Reingold distinguishes between "easy" and "hard"
cases, rather than individual and impact cases. Id. at 546-47. However, the categories obviously overlap.
135. See id. at 565, 569.
136. See id. at 569.
137. See id. at 565-66. See also infra at Part IV.C.
138. See infra Part IV.D.
139. For a more detailed analysis of this question in the law school clinic context, compare Reingold,
supra note 131, with James C. May, Hard Cases From Easy Cases Grow: In Defense of the Fact- And LawIntensive Administrative Law Case, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 87 (1998). See also David F. Chavkin, Spinning
Straw into Gold: Exploring the Legacy of Bellow and Moulton, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 245, 262 (2003);
Antoinette Sedillo Lopez, Learning Though Service in a ClinicalSetting: The Effect of Specialization on Social
Justice and Skills Training, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 307, 318 (2001); Nancy M. Maurer, Handling Big Cases in
Law School Clinics, or Lessonsfrom my Clinic Sabbatical,9 CLINICAL L. REV. 879 (2003).
140. See supra Part II.
141. See infra Part IV.D.
142. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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above-discussed trend toward limited task legal representation1 43 presents the
most recent version of this phenomenon.
It should not be surprising that a decision to provide more limited assistance
to a greater number of persons, as opposed to a higher level of assistance to a
smaller number of persons, often presents a trade-off between the quantity of and
the quality of legal representation. 4 4 Though the current trend toward limited
legal assistance perhaps represents a vote in favor of quantity of representation
over quality of representation, critics of limited legal assistance for poor people
have recently begun to question whether such services provide even a minimal
qualitative level of assistance that would justify the provision of services in such
a form. For example, Robert Bickel has argued that the difficult circumstances of
many of the clients of legal aid providers makes it impossible for such clients to
make use of, and successfully follow up on, the limited services provided to them
through limited legal assistance programs.145 Therefore, he concludes that overall
access to justice for poor persons would actually be increased by providing full
service legal representation to a smaller number of clients, rather than providing
limited assistance that is often of little ultimate benefit to its recipients.'46
Given that clinical legal education often tracks the legal services movement,
it was foreseeable that a number of law school clinics would follow the trend
toward providing limited legal assistance. 1 As a result, such clinics present the
same quality versus quantity trade-offs that were discussed above in the legal aid
context. ' 4 Additionally, the quality versus quantity issue has long been present in
clinical legal education in the form of questions regarding student caseloads. On
the one hand, some advocate limiting clinic student workloads to an extremely
small number of cases. 149 This allows students to take all the time and make
whatever efforts are necessary to handle their cases properly. This is viewed as
enhancing student learning as well as ensuring adequate representation for
clients. On the other hand, some suggest that artificially low case loads fail to
give students a realistic sense of the pressures of actual legal practice, whether in
a legal services or private practice context, and therefore fail to compel students

143.
144.

See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
For a more in depth discussion of the issues presented by, and trade-offs required by resource

limitations in the legal aid context, compare Paul R. Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God": Triage

Among Poor Clients, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2475 (1999), with Justine A. Dunlap, I Don't Want to Play God: A
Response to Professor Tremblay, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2601 (1999).
145. See Bickel, supra note 75, at 332-33.
146. Id. at 374.
147. See, e.g., Margaret Martin Barry, Accessing Justice: Are Pro Se Clinics a Reasonable Response to
the Lack of Pro Bono Legal Services and Should Law School Clinics Conduct Them?, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.

1879 (1999); Mary Helen McNeal, Unbundling and Law School Clinics: Where's the Pedagogy?, 7 CLINICAL
L. REV. 341 (2001).
148.

See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying text. See also Barry, supra note 147, at 1889; McNeal,

supra note 147, at 353-56.
149. See, e.g., Chavkin, supra note 139, at 265-66; Philip G. Schrag, Constructing a Clinic, 3 CLINICAL
L. REV. 175, 181 (1996).
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to develop the time and case management skills necessary to succeed in modem
law practice.1 5 Presently, most clinics operate somewhere in the middle of this
spectrum, providing students with enough cases to simulate "real world"
pressures, while at the same time not overwhelming students or forcing them to
take shortcuts in representation that will result in the development of bad habits
for the students and poor representation for the clients.' 5 ' Nonetheless, clinic
students should be aware of the various ways in which the quality versus quantity
issue plays out in the clinic context.
C. PoliticalInterference
As the above-described history of legal aid points out, at least since the late
1960s, when the legal aid program became more ambitious in terms of both its
size and the objectives of its litigation strategies, a political backlash has resulted
in severe limitations on the program's budget as well as substantive restrictions
on the scope of legal services practice. 52 Given the overlapping objectives
between law school clinics and the legal services program, it should not be
surprising that the work of law school clinics has engendered political opposition
as well.'53 As a prelude to their excellent critique of political interference in law
school clinics from a legal ethics perspective, Professors Robert Kuehn and Peter
Joy go into detail in laying out a history of high profile attacks on the
independence of law school clinics. 4 Though this history will not be recounted
here, two recent confrontations bear particular mention.
In the mid-1990s, Tulane University Law School's Environmental Clinic
undertook to represent a group of low-income residents who opposed the siting
of a Shintech chemical plant in their predominantly minority inhabited
community in Louisiana."' Though the clinic had previously clashed with public
officials regarding its activities,'5 6 the backlash against the clinic from the State's
Governor and other business interests resulting from the Shintech matter was
unprecedented in both its fury and the degree of national attention it received.
Among other actions, the Governor threatened to revoke the University's tax-

150. Cf Jeanne Charn, Service and Learning: Reflections on Three Decades of the Lawyering Processat
Harvard Law School, 10 CLINICAL L. REV. 75, 93 (2003) (discussing relatively heavy caseloads of clinic
students at Harvard's Hale and Dorr Legal Services Center).
151. See, e.g., Melissa L. Breger, Gina M. Calabrese & Theresa A. Hughes, Teaching Professionalismin
Context: Insightsfrom Students, Clients, Adversaries, andJudges, 55 S.C. L. REV. 303, 334 & n. 158 (2003).
152. See supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text.
153. See generally Robert R. Kuehn & Peter A. Joy, An Ethics Critique of Interference in Law School
Clinics, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1971 (2003); Elizabeth M. Schneider, Political Interference in Law School
Clinical Programs:Reflections on Outside Interferenceand Academic Freedom, 11 J.C. & U.L. 179 (1984).
154. See Kuehn & Joy, supra note 153, at 1976-1992.
155. Id. at 1983. For a more detailed discussion of the confrontation involving the Tulane Environmental
Clinic, see the account of its then-director, Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access to Legal Representation: The
Attack on the Tulane EnvironmentalLaw Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 33 (2000).
156.
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exempt status and to deny Tulane students access to money from the state's
education trust fund.'57 In the end, the Governor and the State Attorney General
were able to persuade the Louisiana Supreme Court to amend the State's law
student practice rule to restrict the practices of law clinics in that state,'58 in much
the same manner that opponents of the legal services program were able to
impose regulations limiting the scope of representation available through such
programs. 59 Given the importance of law student practice rules to the growth and
development of clinical legal education,' 6° the restrictions imposed on law student
practice by the Louisiana Supreme Court were chilling, particularly in light of
efforts by opponents of law school clinics to import similar changes to other
jurisdictions.'6 ' Though federal and state courts in Louisiana ultimately upheld
the restrictions on law student practice imposed there, 62 as of this time, other
states have not followed Louisiana in imposing significant new restrictions on
law student practice. 163
Even more recently, in late 2003, the University of North Dakota's legal
clinic came under attack for its involvement in representing a group of plaintiffs
who sought the removal of a display of the Ten Commandments from city-owned
land. ' 6 Though the law school's interim Dean supported the clinic's actions,16'
alumni, members of the public, and legislators who opposed the suit significantly
pressured the law school and the university. Indeed, one State Representative
sought an opinion from the State Attorney General that it was improper for the
state-funded clinic to sue a public entity.' 66 The Attorney General determined that
the clinic's involvement in the suit was proper. 67 Though the Ten Commanments suit was dismissed in 2005, an opponent of the suit personally sued the
clinic's director for the clinic's refusal to represent him in an ill-intentioned
"copycat" suit seeking removal of a "lady justice" statue from a county
courthouse.'68 As of this writing the suit remains pending. 69
157. Id. at 1983.
158. Id. at 1984.
159. See id. at 2030.
160. See, e.g., Carey, supra note 79, at 516; Peter A. Joy, Political Interference with Clinical Legal
Education: Denying Access to Justice, 74 TUL. L. REV. 235, 267-68 (1999).
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163. Id. at 1985.
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Face of Possible Attorney General Opinion, GRAND FORKS HERALD (N.D.), Aug. 27, 2003, at Al. Similar
challenges recently were decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S.
844 (2005) and Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
165. See Dodds, supra note 164, at Al.
166. David Dodds, UND Law Clinic Can Aid Clients v. Fargo: Attorney General's Opinion Affirms
School's Right to Take on "Ten Commandments" Suit, GRAND FORKS HERALD (N.D.), Sept. 27, 2003, at Al.
167. Id. See also 2003 N.D. Op. Att'y Gen. L-42, http://www.ag.state.nd.us/Opinions/2003/Letter/2003L-42.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
168. Steven Lubet, Thou Shalt Not..., THE AM. LAWYER ONLINE, July 1, 2006, http://www.law.com/
jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?hubtype=Inside&id=1 151571922483 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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Clinics at public law schools, such as that of the University of North Dakota,
are particularly vulnerable to political interference because they may be
dependent for their funding on the very public officials whose actions may be
challenged by the clinic. 70 However, public controversy and political interference
are possible in virtually any legal clinic setting, and student attorneys should be
prepared for such possibilities.' 7 '
D. Resource Limitations
The strict resource limitations that have plagued the legal services program
from its inception, and the difficult consequences that have resulted, were
discussed earlier.7 2 By contrast, the growth in clinical legal education programs
over the past few decades has been impressive. As mentioned earlier, the handful
of clinical programs that existed in the United States in the late 1950s 73 have
grown exponentially in the intervening years. Now almost all of the 190 ABA
approved law schools have at least one clinic, and many of them have multiple
clinics.'7 4 Additionally, the vast majority of faculty hiring by law schools in
recent decades 75has been in the areas of clinical legal education and other legal
skills training.
A major boon to clinical legal education occurred in the early 1990s with the
publication of the ABA's "MacCrate Report."'

76

The Report was a much

anticipated and subsequently much discussed assessment by a "blue ribbon"
ABA task force of the state of legal education in America. 77 Though the Report's
detailed findings lie beyond the scope of this primer, among other conclusions,
the Report contended that law schools needed to do more to develop in their
students the fundamental lawyering skills and values the students would need in
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order to practice law effectively following graduation.' 78 Perhaps not surprisingly,
one of the means touted by the Report for improving education in these areas was
additional clinical legal education. 79 Indeed, one scholar described the Report as
the "Magna Carta for clinicians."' 80 In any event, it is indisputable that law
schools increased their clinical offerings in response to the Report."" Moreover,
the Report led to subsequent changes in the ABA's law school accreditation
standards that put additional pressure on law schools to provide more practiceoriented and clinical offerings.'82
It is tempting to conclude from the past three decades of contrasting growth
in clinical education and the retraction of legal services over the same period that
the period has been one of largess for clinical legal education compared to one of
privation for civil legal services. However, before that conclusion can be drawn,
one must look more closely at the somewhat precarious financial situation that
characterizes clinical legal education. Despite the above-described growth in
clinical legal education, it is still the case that the overwhelming majority of
American legal education takes place in the traditional classroom setting, and a
relatively small proportion of overall law school budgets are used to fund clinical
programs.'8 3 Moreover, critics constantly point to the relatively high cost of inhouse clinical programs versus traditional law school classes.' 84 Some have relied
on such cost assessments to go so far as to predict the demise of, or at least a
retrenchment of, in-house clinics in the near future. 85 Given rapid increases in the
overall cost of legal education in recent years, and the corresponding increase in
graduating student debt loads, 8 6 it is hard to imagine that law schools will
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continue to increase significantly funding for clinical legal education in the near
future.'87
Given the expansion in the number and scope of law school clinics, along
with the above-described funding limitations, it may well be the case that
clinicians and their students will find themselves in competition with an
increasing number of colleagues for increasingly smaller slices of a fixed pie of
resources. Thus, while clinical legal education as a whole has enjoyed growth,
individual clinics have indeed experienced resource constraints that differ from
those experienced by legal services providers only in degree, but not in kind.
Moreover, individual clinicians increasingly find their own human capital
resources stretched thin by competing commitments to their cases, their students,
publication requirements, law school committee work, and other service
projects.'88 Thus, clinical law students are unlikely to be able to avoid entirely the
type of resource constraints that have been endemic to anti-poverty law practice
throughout its history.
E. ProfessionalStatus
It has always been the case that legal aid practitioners have enjoyed relatively
low status within the bar as a whole. 8 9 Sociologists of the legal profession have
demonstrated that the greatest status divide within the profession is between
those lawyers who serve entities, such as business organizations, and those who
serve individual clients, with the former being accorded significantly higher
prestige than the latter. '9 However, even within the less prestigious category of
lawyers who serve individual clients, there are further hierarchies of prestige
based upon the relative affluence of the individual client.' 9' Not surprisingly,
legal aid lawyers, who by definition serve clients who are unable to afford private
counsel, fare relatively poorly within these prestige hierarchies.' 92
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There were additional status hierarchies within the legal aid movement as
well, along the lines of the individual versus impact distinction discussed
above.' 93 Because impact work was viewed by many as being more intellectually
challenging than individual case representation, higher status was accorded to
legal aid lawyers who worked on impact cases than to those who worked on
individual cases. 94 However, the above-cited sociological research suggests that
in many instances, this notion that certain legal work is more intellectually
challenging than other work is, in fact, simply a proxy for the question of the
social standing of the client represented.'95 And individual case representation
involves more direct contact with poor individuals than impact representation,
where lawyers represent amorphous 96"classes" of people and often have limited, if
any, contact with individual clients.
With the current restrictions placed on the ability of legal aid lawyers to do
law reform work, 97 most present impact litigation takes place outside of the
traditional legal aid office. Such cases are often handled by public interest
litigators, such as the ACLU, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and the
Washington Legal Foundation, or by private law firms engaged in pro bono
representation, such firms having adequate resources to cover the high expenses
generated by impact cases, or by collaborations with public interest litigators.' 98
Attorneys within these organizations clearly enjoy greater professional prestige
than legal aid lawyers. Thus, in addition to operating within severe resource
constraints,'" often with heavy caseloads, °° under poor working conditions, ° ' and
pursuant to relatively low salaries, 2 legal aid lawyers must also contend with
professional status issues.
Clinical legal education and educators faced similar status issues as they
entered the legal academy. Early clinics were often housed separately from the
rest of the law school.203 Early clinicians lacked faculty status and correspondingly lacked job security and governance rights within their institutions.2 ,
Many were forced to raise whatever funds were needed to operate their
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programs. Certainly, there has been much improvement in these conditions in
recent decades.20 6 Indeed, at many law schools, clinics and clinicians have
achieved parity with doctrinal courses and faculty in terms of measures such as
status, salary, and security.2 7 On the other hand, conditions for clinics and
clinicians at some schools remain remarkably similar to those that prevailed
during the 1960s and 1970s. And there are law schools that represent just about
every conceivable point on the continuum between these two poles.
Given this history of relative subordinate status for clinical legal education
within the
as the
of academy,
pvert
la wor as well ..
201above-discussed issues regarding the prestige
of poverty law work generally, it should not be surprising that some current
clinic students will face questions regarding the value of their participation in the
clinical legal education enterprise. While clinic students will no doubt conclude
in relatively short order that the work performed in law school clinics can be as
complex, challenging, and rewarding as any legal work that can be performed 2
they should be prepared to deal with such questions.
V. CONCLUSION

Given their brevity, it may be the case that the above histories and
discussions represent a gross oversimplification of a very complicated reality.
Indeed, in response to the cutbacks and restrictions discussed above, the present
public interest law movement, an umbrella term which encompasses both civil
legal aid, law school clinics, and more, has morphed into an extremely complex
array of alliances involving public lawyers and private practitioners, government
and non-government entities, federal, state, and local authorities, and combined
public and private foundation funding. For those interested, a number of scholars
are doing important work in attempting to describe and analyze this field.2 °
However, for present purposes, it seemed that delving too far into the
complexities of the present might obscure some of the important points to arise
from the past.
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As stated at the outset, the unsettling feeling that comes from representing
actual clients on actual cases is both the chief learning benefit as well as the
primary source of discomfort in in-house clinical legal education. Hopefully, this
primer can serve as something of a reference point as you navigate your way
through the many issues and challenges that you will confront in your work in the
clinic. Moreover, it is hoped that the sources referred to herein can provide more
detailed assistance to those wishing to inquire further. In any event, bear in mind
that the work you do in the clinic will later become part of the rich tradition and
history that is described above. Good luck on your journey.
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